Sources for this article can be found at the end of the essay.
Introduction
Beijing adamantly claims Taiwan belongs to China and promises to use force if necessary to ensure this is the case. Amidst the tension, 57% of Taiwanese support maintaining the status quo while 30% support full independence, increasing with each new generation who comes of age. It is difficult to define Taiwan without controversy. Even referring to Taiwan as an “island nation,” as it will be in this essay, is used with hesitancy by world leaders due to China identifying Taiwan as a breakaway province. Since 1995, military drills such as flyovers and missile tests have become the norm. To this date, an escalation has not happened, despite numerous threats by China should Taiwan claim independence, or if they are recognised by other powers. The situation is delicate. In October of 2022, chief of US naval operations, Mike Gilday, cautioned a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan before 2024. Many US officials share this view. Moreover, speculation surrounding a hypothetical Chinese war on Taiwan has entered the news cycle often following Russia’s war on Ukraine. No doubt, China has taken notes on the heavy sanctions that were swiftly implemented on Russia following their full-scale attack on Ukraine in 2022. Beijing’s staunch “One China Policy,” which states Taiwan is apart of China and Beijing being the sole legitimate government, has most countries all over the world walking on eggshells. No one to date has actively provoked China into a war, but the limits of Beijing’s patience has been tested which will be discussed in the essay.
Countries who have crossed China by attempting to form Taiwanese relations have seen political and economic consequences, which will be highlighted later. Only wealthy superpowers such as the United States have been able to treat Taiwan as an official country, even if not outright saying so, but stops short of endorsing independence. Under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the US committed to defending Taiwan militarily if invaded by the “mainland.” Still, Taiwan is left out of the United Nations since 1971. Consequently, medical and technological achievements are often disregarded such as Taiwan’s superb handling of Covid-19 in the first year of the pandemic. Accurate contact tracing measures were ignored by the World Health Organisation (WHO), who still has not allowed a Taiwanese membership in the organisation.
This research essay will dive into why Taiwan is important to China from a strategic standpoint and will thus argue that war is unlikely. This reasoning will be proposed due to economics, military and cultural factors including the soft power ability of China. Chinese military strength and ambition to enforce the One China Policy will also be examined. From here, the responses of Beijing to perceived efforts in recognising Taiwan will be analysed to determine if China is actually bluffing when it comes to following through with their threats while paying respect to counter-arguments. The cross-investment between China and Taiwan will also be stressed as to why war is not in either nation’s interest. The analysis will mainly reference US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taipei and also touch on the Chinese response to countries who officially formed relations with Taipei. Not only will this be examined through events unfolding in the news cycle, but through practical thinking inspired by risk assessment matrixes to determine the likelihood of conflict.
Soft power will be explored including the film industry and corporate relationships to China and how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has the upper hand in this arena. Furthermore, counter-arguments will be addressed suggesting how Taiwan could actually face war, due to weaknesses in Taipei’s government, infrastructure and military. It is a challenge to navigate this topic without appearing to lack sensitivity to the real dangers of war, let alone writing as a student almost ten thousand kilometres away. That said, it is important to acknowledge the true risk of war and that innocent people are behind the terms “country,” “state” or “island nation.” The overall argument will be of the idea that a looming war is a more effective strategy in forwarding China’s interests, than actually waging one. From an international security perspective, an analysis of actions by Beijing following breaches of the One China Policy will argue that China may not be able to successfully hold onto Taiwan in the longterm, even if Beijing were to invade.
A Brief History of Taiwan
A brief history on how this situation unfolded is necessary to understand the controversy it is today. Home to the Formosan people, Taiwanese aborigines, early Chinese rulers took little interest in the island in the 3rd century as visitors were confronted with hostility from both pirates or native islanders. As it would turn out, Taiwan, or Formosa, as it was known from the 16th century, was certainly valuable. The lands were fertile ground. Trade ports were accessible and agricultural industries grew rapidly. The Dutch dominated the island in the 17th century as a trade post with multiple ports. Following a revolt against Dutch tax in 1652, the Ming dynasty forced out the Europeans in 1661 and the island would fall under Chinese control. For the next two hundred years, a Chinese identity was prevalent among the islanders. If one were to speak with a Chinese nationalist today, they might reference this period as enough of a significant reason to why Taiwan should be under Chinese control. Following the first Sino-Japanese war, Japan occupied Taiwan from 1895 under the Shimonoseki Treaty. In 1945, following Japan’s defeat in World War II, Taiwan once again became a part of China. However, Taiwanese natives would hold no nostalgia for either Japan, or the corrupt Sun Yat-sen leadership whose soldiers pillaged homes. Nor would they respect the Kuomintang-led government whose armies fired upon civilians during the anti-government uprising on 28 February, 1947. This would be known as the “228 massacre.”
Taiwanese would emerge more forward thinking and sophisticated than their new occupiers. The Republic of China (ROC) ignored the fact that Taiwan was already forming their own identity. Moreover, the island nation was already ahead of China in terms of industry including telecommunications and railway infrastructure. Within a few years following 1945, Taiwan became a self-sustaining government with its own currency, passport and international relations. A fully functioning democracy would gradually emerge by the mid-90s following four decades of martial law where, under its enforcement, civilians were banned from traveling to the islands of Kinmen and Matsu and new political parties could not be established. The retirement of lifetime legislators led to a full parliamentary election in 1992 which spelled closure for a nation with a bloody history under both Chinese and Japanese rule. The handover to China under the newly formed ROC felt regressive to the Taiwanese in the face of their progressive ambitions.
Taiwan would continue to adopt western ideals; a democracy with a fusion of American and European economics, respect for human rights, as well as freedom of press and speech. The nation would become a corporate powerhouse investing not only in themselves, but around the world, including China. Taiwan’s current military allies are the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Only fifteen countries are officially in defiance of the One China Policy and recognise Taiwan as a country. These are poorer countries without much influence such as Belize, Guatemala, Paraguay and the Marshall Islands, just to name a few. This list has been growing slowly in the past two decades. Taiwan’s culture, history, rapid growth, innovations and growing professional reputation has all come together to form a pronounced Taiwanese identity. The trajectory of Taiwan’s history would suggest the nation to be on track for official independence, if not for the complicated and tense political shadow that follows the nation. If not for the One China Policy and exclusion from the United Nations and World Health Organisations, one would never question Taiwan’s status of a country. Many still do not.
Beijing Response: Why War Is Less Likely
Beijing today has increased its military arsenal five-fold over the last two decades and uses Taiwan as a bargaining chip to assert their power on the world stage. To date, China’s central foreign policy aspiration is to prevent Taiwan from becoming independent. At the United Nations, it is not uncommon for China to vote against helping a country who formed relations with Taipei. In 1999, China vetoed to end a peacekeeping mission to Macedonia after they had recognised Taiwanese independence. Two out of the seven times China has ever vetoed a resolution at the UN were for this same reason. China vetoed another peacekeeping mission in Central America in 1997 because of Guatemala’s recognition of Taiwan as a country. The security measure would fail to pass, speaking volumes to the influence of the One China Policy. Speaking after the vote, a Chinese official stated “the question of Taiwan is a major question of principle that bears upon China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and the cause of national reunification.” China has operated air and sea exercises in the Taiwan strait since 1995. The US would respond by flying their own craft into the area to warn China not to enclose on Taiwan. This was the first Taiwan strait crisis. This ongoing and evolving dilemma is analysed best by example, rather than data alone. For instance, as J. David Singer describes in The Level of Analysis Problem, common sense would tell us the accelerator of a slow moving car needs only pressure to gain momentum. Thus, any global action decided upon Taiwan requires much respect in regards to causation.
In 2000, following the crisis in the straits, Taiwan’s then president, Chen Shui-bian committed to not declaring independence from China, despite his own Democratic Progressive Party calling for it. Chen himself believed Taiwan was already sovereign, which he may have publicly said out of fear of being responsible for a war. This nervous tension would grow on pace with increasing Chinese military strength and the global community would avoid putting too much pressure on the accelerator. On the contrary, since the election of the first woman president, Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan has been increasingly overt in moving toward independence. As Tsai stated proceeding her victory, “we hope China can thoroughly understand the opinion expressed by the Taiwanese people in this election and review their current policies,” before adding that “we have a separate identity and we’re a country of our own.”
China is not only intimidating from a military standpoint, but also holds a strong soft power position. This is a tool formed to further cement its commitment to One China. As global relations with China would ebb and flow from the 2010s, Chinese investment into major Hollywood studios allowed for more control of the western film industry, dictating creative choices, influencing the narrative and invoking propaganda. This can be seen through the omission of the Taiwanese flag on Tom Cruise’s jacket in Top Gun: Maverick, to a heroic portrayal of Chinese police forces in The 355 which may be nothing more than a subtle detail to the average, casual movie-goer. Beyond Hollywood, Italian fashion brand Versace found themselves apologising to China over not listing Hong Kong as a part of China in a marketing campaign. Beijing’s swift actions apply to Hong Kong just the same. Airlines also walk on eggshells when a customer wants to book a flight to Taipei— often referred to “Chinese-Taipei,” or “Taipei, R.O.C.” Airlines have come under fire for listing Taiwan as a destination “country.” Soft power is used to prop up current cooperation between China and other major countries who may support Taiwan at heart, but do not want to risk military escalation over their interests. The One China Policy is followed for this reason. Countless apologies from celebrities, corporations and politicians are due to political pressure from their own countries to maintain the peace, rather than one’s opinion on what China thinks of them.
It does appear more recently that support for Taiwanese independence is expanding worldwide amid a growing list of countries standing up for the island nation. A global analysis shows an erosion of this kind of “respect” to China and a test of credibility behind Beijing’s threats. Without Taiwan, China does not have the bargaining chip it has often relied upon in their relations with other countries. To make their case worse, China is heavily reliant of Taiwan as a tech hub and trading partner which will be discussed later on, adding complication to the logic of military action against the island nation. Multiple visits from US leaders in the summer of 2022 has uncovered much hesitancy in the CCP. The failure of China to live up to their threats, which were amplified among the press, are telling. Based on their actual responses to violations of the One China Policy or endorsement of Taiwan’s legitimacy, Beijing feels they are either not militarily ready to attack Taiwan, not capable of winning, or simply do not have the interest in doing so. Despite this, the CCP would like to hold onto the political power they have through maintaining the illusion of a cold war over Taiwan.
Following then United States House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, Beijing revealed that it did not have the cards to follow up on President’s Xi’s threat a week earlier when Xi told President Biden over the phone "those who play with fire perish by it.” China’s rhetoric response to Pelosi did not deliver on this threat. In the lead up to Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, the headlines were alit with warnings of war. US jets and ships stood by as the Speaker landed. This sensationalism was designed to serve the interest of Beijing. The fear surrounding such a visit highlighted the dangers of crossing China and the potential costs of provoking them. The hype gave China exactly what they wanted— until it didn’t. Pelosi went along with the visit by meeting President Tsai in Taipei declaring, “now, more than ever, America’s solidarity with Taiwan is crucial,” while also adding that “we are supporters of the status quo… we don’t want anything to happen to Taiwan by force.”
In response to Pelosi’s visit, China conducted joint naval and air exercises across the Taiwan strait. Live-firing of heavy artillery took place, as well as the launching of conventional-headed missiles into the sea east of Taiwan. According to the Taiwan Ministry of National Defence (MND), 21 Chinese aircraft entered Taiwanese airspace. Additional Chinese fighter jets flew the south-eastern region of Taiwan. The drills completely surrounded Taiwan, but were nothing new aside from a closer proximity. “Go easy on us,” the everyday Taiwanese might mutter to themselves sarcastically. This is something Taiwanese have learned to go about their daily lives as many have grown desensitised. For others, the danger was real as reports of missiles flying over the island came in. Even if the intention was not to strike Taiwan, a technical or human error resulting in an accidental strike could have led to a drastic escalation. Economic consequences were felt as China placed a ban on certain Taiwanese imports such as fruits and fish. Exports of sand from China used in Taiwanese construction projects, as well as semiconductors, were also banned. Moreover, cyberattacks temporarily shut down Taiwan government websites, which are presumed to be orchestrated by Beijing. Later, this essay will explore why this massive response is still not enough to validate the credibility of an invasion. What was more troublesome were the economic sanctions imposed mentioned above following the visit. Many criticised Pelosi and the US government for not taking Taiwanese businesses into consideration. Perhaps the visit was inconsiderate, or even sloppy, but it was not exactly thoughtless. Much intel was gained from the visit, especially when a US Congressional delegation would follow weeks later, adding insult to injury to China who were still conducting drills.
All of these actions occurred in response to a 19 hour visit by a US politician. What played out was Pelosi essentially testing the waters for Chinese commitment to their interests. In the end, a potential US visit from President Tsai may actually seem more likely, despite bringing even more pandemonium, though would not likely result in war under China’s present leadership. The results that played out were telling of the credibility behind China’s words. While some journalists saw the move as marking a deteriorating relationship between the US and China, this is not entirely the US’ responsibility to heal any division resulting from the visit. A change of course from China should not be ruled out. With the majority of Taiwanese supporting their independence, China will have a hard time integrating their values to the island. Even if Taiwan were to surrender, the transition would be rough and costly. Cultural friction would transform the spirit of Taiwan.
The fear surrounding war between Taiwan and China also undermines the current economic relations between the two states and represents a layer of local analysis. In not honouring the sovereignty of Taiwan, China risks severely damaging its own economy. According to the Taiwan Bureau of Trade, “China is Taiwan’s biggest export partner, with an export value of $515 billion from 2017 to 2022.” This is more than double the US, it’s next biggest partner, followed by the US and Hong Kong. The two economies are inextricably linked. During Pelosi’s press conference in Taipei, the Speaker stressed the importance of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and called for US legislation to offer “greater opportunity for US-Taiwan economic cooperation.” Between the lines, it is clear the US understands how important the chip industry is to China as well. Taiwan is a major producer of semiconductors. If China invaded, the Chinese tech industry would suffer. The US’ own interests in semiconductor investment is a strong reason the US will maintain its commitment to protecting Taiwan. Theoretically, Taiwan could even destroy its own plants just to further devastate China’s economy. The economic benefits shared between both countries would not be worth sacrificing. Moreover, as Taiwan becomes less dependent on China for trade, for instance New Zealand’s trade agreement, this could shift the dynamic in Taiwan’s favour. International sanctions alone would be detrimental for China as they have seen how quickly these came into effect with Russia.
Brussels-based economist, Hosuk Lee-Makiyama adds to this thinking; “the CCP knows how to govern, that being a big power means that you need to make compromises with other big powers, and this is the reason they won’t like a change to the status quo.” Invading Taiwan is not of economic interest to China when the two countries already invest into one another. Even Taiwan’s military sent a unit for repair, in China, though the intention behind doing so most likely malicious. Perception is very important when analysing this area of conflict and the unpopularity of Chinese unification in Taiwan is something the CCP must consider. It goes without saying that Beijing would face an uphill battle with the Democratic Progressive Party continuing to be elected on an anti-unification platform. It would be China who would have to change to reflect Taiwanese values in order for unification to be even remotely considered.
From a practical standpoint, what tools can be used to determine the risk of a Taiwan-China war? The agreements and treaties promising to defend Taiwan represent a liberalist view whilst not committing integration of Taiwan into global institutions. Because of this, they do not have the same rights and recognition as the next sovereign state. Doing so would cement global commitment to security, but at the risk of starting a war to do so, thus defeating the purpose of official recognition. Taiwan’s exclusion from the UN Security Council does not help decipher the ambiguity over how to approach this problem militarily. Taiwan’s strong allies have formed a collective security model that has found world powers in a perpetual state of conflict prevention and management. When facing increased military drills from China, the next stage is management, even if a war has not broken out. During Chinese military drills, it is very possible for something to go wrong, provoking one side or the other. Thus far, a collective security response is avoided each time as China de-escalates months after threatening action, aside from routine exercises. Therefore, China represents a figurative vehicle revving its engine but never moving forward by flooring the accelerator.
A better model for demonstrating the actual security threat is the risk assessment matrix used by security officials to determine the gravity of a potential threat. This was most undoubtably utilised by officials as Pelosi pushed for her visit. Now that the actual impact of the Speaker’s visit was witnessed, the same risk assessment matrix can be used to examine the probable impact of Taiwan declaring independence, given what is known about the Chinese military and the reasoning for hesitation, as discussed above. China’s military capability suggests a major impact on Taiwan’s infrastructure is highly likely if attacks are not prevented by Taiwan and allied forces. This impact will be dissected in the counter-arguments below. Based on Chinese interests that are reliant on Taiwan, as well as considering past responses to disrespecting the One China Policy, the probability of an attack is lower. However, this is only true if going by rationality. The probability could not go below 50% due to internal pressure in the CCP and the potential of a wishful thinking scenario leading Beijing to act irrationally. Should a conflict break out, the longevity of Chinese forces and their ability to succeed comes into question. In short, this remains a delicate situation, but China does not reflect the force they say they are. In all likelihood, China will let Taiwan go as it would be wise to do so. Their partnership could grow peacefully and better relations will be formed globally with both China and Taiwan. China could, however, choose to dial back their military ambition by only annexing Taipei, or a small region or island of Taiwan, which is a higher probability than a full scale invasion. This would only result in a stalemate as doing so would not be enough to invoke laws across the rest of the territory. Therefore, this possibility is not likely either.
Counter Arguments
The arguments for China’s bluff in this essay are formed assuming the world to be rational, which can be seen as naive. That said, it is worth looking at strong counter-arguments as to why a military takeover of Taiwan is still in the cards, no matter how irrational they may appear. In reality, there are valid reasons Beijing is holding back following up on their threats for the time being. The amount of investment China has already concentrated into its foreign policy, namely Taiwan, cannot only be for effect. Increased reports of Taiwanese military officials bribed to spy for Beijing have emerged, but it is yet to be seen how widespread this problem is. Should it be found that Taiwanese loyalty or morale is suffering, this would spell a huge challenge for Taipei that would have to be addressed immediately. What this counter-argument does not account for, however, is that the majority of Taiwanese are patriotic to their homeland. It is doubtful enough military officials could be bought off to make a difference.
Military pay could be remedied, but other issues are not as easy. Though geographically diverse, Taiwan’s major cities are in concentrated areas. Debate over the longevity of a China offence may not be merited when Taiwan, in theory, could be attacked from many positions at once. This is assuming no foreign intervention, but the Chinese military would not be as stretched as Russians forces are in Ukraine. Taiwan’s defences, along with allied forces, would have to fail for this to be the case. Another scenario is the artificial islands off the Taiwan strait serving as both the main catalyst and ground zero for conflict. Chinese construction of these military outposts has been a source of great tension in the region. An offshore war could avoid harming Chinese interests altogether.
The psychology alone behind the mistakes of leaders, particularly dictatorships, speaks volumes to the grandiose sentiment when striving for a goal. Wishful thinking follows, as Goldstein and Pevehouse write in regards to George W. Bush declaring victory in a war the US would go on to lose a decade later. This is currently the case in regards to Putin with Ukraine, but President Xi may be more cautious in his approach. If so, a calculated Xi could be a bigger threat to Taiwan compared to Putin. Enough planning and growth of military resources makes a successful invasion more likely. What President Xi would need to succeed is for Taiwan’s allies to buckle at the moment of military action from Beijing. This could very well be a possibility due to potential wartime fatigue that may be experienced globally in the coming years. If by the time Taiwan faces an invasion by China, the congressional gridlock of the US could be a problem slowing down aid to Taiwan. The Congressional GOP took fifteen votes before finally electing a new Speaker of the House. Congress is not the most functional branch of government in the US to put it lightly, though action could be taken through the executive branch.
Political dysfunction aside, continuous financial aid to Ukraine could contribute to fatigue among taxpayers in supporting other nations’ conflicts. For instance, if Americans become weary spending on foreign operations and reflects so in polling, politicians may follow suit and switch to a more isolated position. Beijing could be waiting for this exact situation to present itself before attacking. In this case, it would be China calling America’s bluff. The same argument could be applied to other allies of Ukraine including Australia, who may instead continue its refugee program while halting further foreign aid. On the contrary, the European Union may not falter its support with Ukraine, but Taiwan simply may not be of interest should the time come. Nonetheless, the amount of resources China is investing to prevent Taiwan from becoming independent is alarming. Even if Taiwan is no more than a bargaining tool for Beijing, is the island nation truly worth the price they are paying? This is where rationality, or lack thereof, is difficult to gauge. A dictatorship surrounded by yes men will fail to see the writings on the wall and march full speed ahead into a burning building. If groupthink is the driver behind China’s wheel, everyone will suffer. Alternatively, if President Xi and Beijing’s hesitation is a sign of rational thinking, a more desirable outcome is still possible.
A critical challenge Taiwan faces is keeping up with growing energy demands. The island nation has been slow to reach its alternative energy goals, according to the European Chamber of Commerce in Taipei, who notes dysfunctional leadership across multiple departments being responsible for the lack of progress. Power outages in 2017 affected nearly seven million households and in the spring of 2022, an accident at a power plant caused a widespread outage, including in Taipei. If missile strikes are not averted, it would not take long for Taiwan to go dark. The moment this would happen, however, would be the beginning of China’s economical consequences as Taiwanese industries which China relies upon would be destroyed. In noting weaknesses to Taiwan’s infrastructure, war may not even be China’s path to victory. Blockades, cyber warfare and starvation, are all weapons that could be utilised. China may inflict damage upon Taiwan, but the enormous resources to fight consistently means the region will never be a part of China, at least entirely. Still, the cost of human life and suffering would be high. Taiwan achieving independence without bloodshed is the best the world can hope for, but the counter-arguments above do not promise this and speak to why governments around the world have remained so cautious.
Conclusion
The current status quo of Taiwan-China policy operates on a no-solution basis with the intention of keeping the peace. This policy is shared by powerful states whereas smaller, poorer states have recognised Taiwanese independence. On paper, the US follows the One China Policy but actions such as political visits to Taipei suggest veering away from this approach. The reactions from Beijing during these perceived violations have not escalated into conflict, but air and navel drills have been intensified with live artillery fired closer to Taiwanese soil and over their airspace. China continues to concentrate vast resources and finances into preventing Taiwan from becoming independent and has been the main focus of Beijing’s foreign policy. When analysing the situation from a traditional risk assessment standpoint which references Chinese military capabilities and the risks to Beijing, it is unlikely a wide scale conflict will occur. Questions still remain surrounding the longevity of Chinese military strength to carry out such an operation over a long period of time, especially in the face of powerful allies committed to defending Taiwan. There could come a day where nations become wary of exporting military power to fight foreign wars. Should this become the case, Taiwan will be in greater danger.
A hypothetical transition from Taiwan’s progressive values to the Communist China Party’s beliefs would not be smooth. Cultural friction would transform the spirit of the island nation and would be undesirable with the majority of Taiwanese favouring independence. As a degradation of China’s threats continue, Beijing appears not willing or capable of an invasion. Many academics and analysts believe the status quo is the only solution and that state and transnational actors will continue to tread lightly. The One China Policy has been challenged by the US and smaller countries, but the list of support grows for Taiwan. For now, Beijing’s poker face will continue to be tested until clearer intentions present themselves to be assessed. As Singer puts forward, explanations carry more weight than a risk model. Apply too much pressure, China flinches. Invoke provocation, they attack. The reverse works just the same and against the consequences, China fares better staying clear of conflict. More data and continued analysis of future events will help understand the probabilities as this is a rapidly evolving standoff. If an invasion were to occur, no matter how large or small, it will be up to the Taiwanese people to ask for help, followed by their allies to decide whether or not to hold their promise of keeping Taiwan safe. As long as populations of allied nations remain supportive of Taiwan, the nation has a safe and independent future.
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